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encies of reinforcement. Scientific discovery is Lacey and Schwartz’s paradigmatic
case of such behavior. As an example of a scientific discovery they cite Skinner’s
own invention of the Skinner box. This was perhaps an unfortunate choice since,
in the second volume of his autobiography {The Shaping of a Behaviorist),
Skinner makes a point of showing how this particular invention arose by degrees
from earlier reinforced behavior. It is no more difficult, in principle, to make such
interpretations than it is to explain the fall of a leaf in terms of gravity and
aerodynamics. Whether a particular effort at interpretation is worthwhile is
another question.
It would seem, from the success of current applications of behaviorism to
everyday life, especially to situations involving self-control, that interpretation in
open settings is worthwhile and that human life, in all its richness, may be more
regular than Lacey and Schwartz suspect.
Let us now turn briefly to the supposed superiority of the mentalistic vocabul
ary as applied to open settings. Lacey and Schwartz claim that the richness of the
teleological (i.e., mental) explanation ‘depends on its capacity to display a wide
variety, pattern and sequence of actions as leading to the same goal.’ If this is a
statement about psychology (as opposed to physics or biology), it needs to be
accompanied by a method to ascertain why a person believes certain actions to be
appropriate to a given goal. Otherwise, what stops a person from believing any
action is appropriate to any goal? No such method is provided by Lacey and
Schwartz or, indeed, by any mentalist. Lacey and Schwartz believe that people
may act in accordance with what they are told or contrary to what they are told,
in accordance with a set of logical principles or contrary to a set of logical
principles, in accordance with their nature or contrary to their nature, in accord
ance with what is good for them or contrary to what is good for them, etc. At
what point does an explanation become too rich? Lacey and Schwartz reject the
notion that belief is governed by any set of potential rules, no matter how
complex. For them it is impossible to understand how people acquire their beliefs,
it is impossible to know for sure what their beliefs are, hence it is impossible for
Lacey and Schwartz to understand why people behave as they do.

LACEY AND SCHWARTZ REPLY TO RACHLIN
ON THE APPLICABILITY OF APPLICABILITY
Rachlin identifies practical application, the achievement of control, as the pre
eminent criterion for assessing the explanatory power of a theory. In this he is
consistent with arguments made many times over the years by Skinner. In our
response we will focus on this one point. But let us first be clear on where we do
not take issue with Rachlin. First, we agree with Rachlin that radical behaviorist
theories have generated significant practical applications, arguably more so than
the alternatives he discusses. Second, an acceptable theory must generate practic
al applications. However, the necessity here is neither logical nor methodological,
but social. Practical applications are a requirement for the social support that
makes rapid theory development possible. Third, ‘mentalism’, as characterized by
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Rachlin, is indeed trivial. It is not a serious alternative to radical behaviorism.
With these areas of agreement clear, let us turn to the significance of practi
cal application for validating theories. The view that the power generated by a
theory, manifested by the extent to which it allows us to control things, is a
reflection of the explanatory power of a theory is deeply rooted in contemporary
scientific culture. The argument for it is apparently simple and compelling. Power
results from having discovered the laws of nature, or of a relevant domain of
nature, such as behavior. When we exercise control, we are merely bringing about
the boundary conditions within which those laws are known to be operative in the
given domain. Conversely, if there are some putative explanatory principles that
do not allow us to achieve control, it must be because these principles do not
actually represent laws of the domain. So application, through control, allows us
to separate the wheat from the chaff; to distinguish the actual laws of nature from
the pretenders.
• r. u ■
We will evaluate this argument only with respect to the domain of behavior,
though our remarks could be extended to other domains. Clearly, there is some
thing right about the argument. Its weakness lies in the diffieulty and ambiguity of
specifying the ‘relevant domain’ over which the explanatory scheme is meant to
operate. The possibility of implementing behavioral controls is a consequence of
having discovered the regularities (laws) of some domain. The question is: which
domain? We have argued that the controls (successful applications) enpndered
by radical behaviorism have occurred only in what we called closed settinp . On
this argument the regularities expressed in radical behaviorist theories are just the
laws of behavior in closed settings. We have further argued that, from the
perspective of teleological explanation (which is not ‘mentalist’ as Rachlin defines
the term), behavioral regularities of the sort described by behaviorists only occur
in closed settings. So the laws are laws that operate in the domain of closed
settings, and the applications are applications that work in the domain of closed
settings. That the domain of operation of laws and the domain of successful
application line up is hardly a defect of the theory
in itself.
However, what our argument makes clear is that the mere fact of successful
control itself tells us nothing about the extent of the explanatory power of the
principles that underlie this power to control. That the principles enable control
of behavior in closed settings implies nothing about whether or not they are
salient principles for explaining behavior in general. Whether they do the job in
open settings is an empirical question. If they do not, their explanatory scope will
depend upon the relative frequency of closed and of open settings in the environ
ments in which people typically find themselves — another empirical issue.
We are not making a skeptical point here, or attempting to forestall on
ordinary, inductive move from simple to complex cases. We have argued from the
perspective of teleology, a scheme that not only offers concrete explanations
where behaviorism offers only gestures, but also serves to define the limits of
applicability of behaviorist principles, portraying behavior that is under the con
trol of those principles as a degenerate case of purposive behavior. It is true that a
teleological scheme has the conceptual resources to explain every action, but that
is not the vice that Rachlin suggests, since it does not offer the sort of trivial
‘explanations’ that Rachlin’s mentalistic straw person does. Moreover, it makes a
difference — a practical, everyday differenee. Accepting teleology in broad out
line implies interacting with other human beings differently from the way implied
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by the behaviorist outline; emphasizing relations of dialogue rather than control.
Rachlin seems to offer two responses to this argument. First, he suggests that
there are clear instances of the application of operant principles in open settings,
for example, procedures of ‘self-control’ and the treatment of pain. Elsewhere
(Schwartz, 1984, Ch. 7; Schwartz and Lacey, 1982, Ch. 8), we argued that a
number of applied behavioral procedures like those of ‘self-control’ could not
properly be regarded as exemplifications of operant principles; that they make
sense only in terms of teleological categories. Lacey (1985) made a similar argu
ment concerning Rachlin’s (1985) behavioral analysis of pain and its treatment.
We note, however, that arguments of this type are of the required kind, if they
are successful, to undermine our conclusion.
The second response is to suggest that mentalistic terms, presumably includ
ing teleological ones, can be translated into behaviorist terms, though the transla
tions may be rather complex and cumbersome. Our argument suggests that such
‘translations’ are impossible, at least if they are to have any explanatory role,
since we have used the teleological scheme in part to identify the limits of
behaviorist explanation. Over and above this general, and admittedly arguable,
point we can only deal with such translations as are explicitly and specifically
offered. Rachlin offers none.
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